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Ideological and organizational reconfigurations from the extreme right to the radical and populist right 
have been a major focus area of European political science over the past two decades (Mudde, 2007). How-
ever, the equally profound mutations of parties that pertain to the communist and radical left family have at-
tracted less attention, until the electoral success of the Spanish party Podemos (We Can) and the Greek coali-
tion Syriza illustrated the strategy of left-wing populism (Kioupkiolis, 2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 
2014). Regarding populism in France, while the radical right party Front national (National Front, FN) has 
been the center of much research, very few studies focused on the evolution of the French radical left since 
the collapse of the Parti communiste français (French Communist Party, PCF) and the ephemeral success of 
the extreme left in the early 2000s (Raynaud, 2006; Reynié, 2007). This research aims to fill this gap and 
contribute to existing literature by shedding light on the theoretical and organizational transitions of the 
French radical left since that period. 
We focus on one political actor — Jean-Luc Mélenchon — who has been the architect of new forms of 
electoral coalitions of the French radical left family and of the populist strategy. After leaving the Parti so-
cialiste (Socialist Party, PS) in 2008, Mélenchon ran in the presidential elections twice. First, in 2012, as the 
candidate of the Front de gauche (Left Front, FG); his objective then was to “bring the left together.” In 
2017, he ran as the candidate of the new movement he created one year earlier, La France insoumise (Un-
bowed France, LFI), in order to “federate the people.” To do so, he mobilized a people-elite axis instead of a 
left-right one and presented LFI as a “popular movement” freed from any political party. This evolution has 
often been described as a radical shift from a traditional radical left strategy (in 2012) to the adoption of a 
populist strategy (in 2017). However, we argue that the transition was rather a slow process and entailed 
three dimensions that did not occur at the same time and pace. We contend that Mélenchon’s ideological 
evolution paved the way for a strategical change in terms of campaigning, and that the discursive and organi-
zational evolution toward populism during the presidential campaigns he led was dependent on the political 
context. As such, both movements can be qualified as populist to some extent, and Mélenchon’s 2017 cam-
paign merely constituted a step further in the progression of populism. The main objective of this paper is to 
analyze these transformations by focusing on: Mélenchon’s ideological evolution and strategic changes in 
terms of organization and coalitions, and discursive choices during the campaigns which we put in perspec-
tive with the evolution of his electorate. This choice allows us to understand the genesis, manifestations, and 
consequences of left-wing populism in France. 
For our analysis, we adopt a minimal definition of populism. Scholars of populism still discuss the degree 
to which populism can be considered as a (thin) ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a type of discourse (Laclau, 
2005) that can be used by any party family across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, they agree on a min-
imal definition of populism based on three elements: (1) anti-elitism, (2) the appeal to the people based on an 
antagonistic boundary between the people and the elite, and (3) popular sovereignty as the idea that “politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale [general will] of the people.” Other elements, such as the 
adoption of a patriotic discourse (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2020), the presence of a strong leadership 
(Mouffe, 2018), and the “proclamation of a crisis” (Moffitt, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014) can be considered as cor-
ollaries of the minimal definition of populism. 
March and Mudde (2005) show how radical left parties have sought to reinvent themselves after the end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of the communist model, and increasingly turned to populism (March, 2011; 
2008). Populist socialist parties refer to the articulation of the socialist ideology and the populist worldview. 
March notes that from the mid-2000s, across Europe, a new subtype of parties often embodied this combina-





tion. These parties are part of the radical left family: they are located to the left of social democracy, and are 
characterized by their anti-capitalism, their opposition to globalized neoliberalism, their defense of a mixed 
economy model, and their adherence to liberal democracy. However, they rather call upon the people than 
upon the working class. Their anti-capitalism is manifested by a critique of the establishment and of a “cor-
rupt elite”; they focus on identity rather than on the notion of social class, and are more oriented toward post-
materialist demands. Die Linke (The Left) in Germany and the Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party, SP) in 
the Netherlands epitomized this new type of parties. However, no radical left party in France at the time was 
classified as a populist socialist party, as the PCF was a reformed communist party, and the Nouveau Parti 
Anticapitaliste (New Anti-Capitalist Party, NPA) was an extreme left party. 
We propose to analyze the slow mutations of part of the French radical left toward populism in the 2010s 
by focusing on Mélenchon’s presidential campaigns. The first part of this paper traces Mélenchon’s long-
term intellectual trajectory. We document Mélenchon’s important intellectual transition from orthodox 
Marxism to post-Marxism, which implies to rethink the political subject of change from the “working class” 
to the “people”) and can be considered a precondition for the adoption of a populist strategy. We then com-
pare, through the prism of populism, the two organizations — FG and LFI — on two particular points: the 
discourse used, on the one hand, and the electorate reached, on the other. We rely on a mixed methodology: a 
qualitative analysis with data retrieved from participant observations and a collection of activist productions, 
and a quantitative analysis exploring the content of speeches through a lexicometric analysis and the data 
from large-scale national post-elections surveys. The methods are presented in detail at the beginning of each 
section. 
This paper provides a dual contribution to the literature. On the one hand, it documents the organizational 
transformations of part of the radical left in France, its ideological and discursive foundations, and the dis-
crepancy between the electoral target and the actual pool of supporters. On the other hand, it nourishes the 
theoretical reflections on the conditions for the emergence of left-wing populism insofar as the French case 
presents many differences from the usual reference cases from Southern Europe. Contrary to other forms of 
southern left-wing populism: (1) the emergence of LFI was not the result of an economic and political crisis; 
(2) LFI was created after its leader had reached the limits of his first strategy (the union of the left); and (3) 
in France, the political arena was already familiar with a populist discourse — the radical right one of FN — 
which forced Mélenchon to constantly distance himself from it in order to prevent any amalgam. 
 
 
2. The Genesis of the Populist Strategy in France: From the Front de gauche to 
La France insoumise 
 
In France, the advent of a populist left political force appeared after a decade of reconfigurations of the 
radical left family. As we will show, the adoption of a populist discourse goes hand in hand with the adher-
ence to post-Marxist ideologies and with the abandonment of orthodox Marxism to which the traditional rad-
ical left used to refer. Mélenchon’s intellectual trajectory illustrates this ideological shift well. It was fol-
lowed by a strategic evolution (adoption of a populist discourse) and an organizational evolution. In this sec-
tion, we address these different elements by using various sources to reconstitute Mélenchon’s trajectory and 
his political endeavors. We mainly mobilize a collection of activist productions in paper and digital form. 
 
 




2.1 The ideological foundations of left-wing populism: from orthodox Marxism to post-
Marxism 
 
Although Jean-Luc Mélenchon became a central actor during the 2010s, he was not new to French poli-
tics. Born in 1951, he joined the Parti socialiste in 1976 to support François Mitterrand, after a short career in 
small Trotskyist parties during his studies. He was an elected member of the Senate in the socialist group 
from 1986 to 2008, and participated in Jospin’s socialist government from 2000 to 2002. In total, Mélenchon 
dedicated thirty years of his political life to the PS, twenty of which were spent in the most left-wing factions 
to push the party toward the left, an important signifier for him at the time. Indeed, like many political actors 
from his generation, Mélenchon grew up in politics leaning on the left-right continuum that was essentially 
conceived in terms of economic conflicts. He stated several times that he “built himself intellectually on 
Marxism” 1 (Mouffe and Mélenchon, 2016), referring to the propensity to explain the state of society through 
the economic conflict and class struggle. However, at the same time, he also drew on other intellectual and 
historical traditions such as French socialism, French communism, left republicanism, alter-mondialism, Lat-
in American socialism, radical ecology, and techno-progressivism (Chiocchetti, 2019). Yet, through a slow 
evolution, Mélenchon increasingly adopted the populist worldview and replaced the interpretation of the so-
ciety in terms of class struggle with the conflict between the people and the elite — the people being an ar-
ticulation through a “chain of equivalence” of several social groups with different causes that share an oppo-
sition to the elite. In the mid-2010s, in his book L’ère du people (The Age of the People, 2014), he theorized 
the emergence of a new political subject: the “urban people” (homo urbanus). His intellectual evolution must 
be understood more broadly by looking at the changes of the theoretical references used by left-wing actors, 
which can be explained by at least three elements.  
First, the expansion of the tertiary sector in the 1970s, the rise of post-materialist aspirations and values, 
and the emergence of the new social movements (NSMs) in the 1960s and 1970s challenged the reach of the 
orthodox Marxist heuristic and its interpretation of social conflict solely in economic and materialist terms 
(Escalona and Vieira, 2013). Indeed, the NSMs — by prioritizing demands related to identity rather than so-
cial classes and post-materialist claims — showed the limits of class essentialism and economism developed 
in orthodox Marxist analyses. As a result, some political actors of the traditional radical left, such as Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, began to show interest in post-Marxist theories. In 1985, Laclau and Mouffe 
emphasized the proliferation of new post-materialist struggles and the inability of the left to understand these 
new forms of contestation. Facing this changed context, they advocated the adoption of another political log-
ic: left-wing populism. From the 2000s, Laclau and Mouffe became the “theoretical references” of several 
movements and actors of the radical left, including Kirchnerism in Argentina, Podemos in Spain, and Mélen-
chon in France. Mélenchon considered that their role as intellectuals is to “lead the way” (Mélenchon, 2012) 
for radical left political leaders and activists. 
Second, the fall of the communist model is a key event in order to understand the mutations of the con-
temporary radical left and the growing recourse to post-Marxism by left-wing actors. Following Keucheyan 
(2017), we consider that theories are “dependent on their socio-political conditions of elaboration and circu-
lation,” which implies that a political defeat can also lead to the “defeat” of a theory. March (2007) shows 
how, in this new context, part of the radical left — in search of a new ideology, of new theoretical refer-
ences, and of a new strategy — adopted a populist socialist strategy that emphasizes the people rather than 
the working class. Mélenchon’s initial distancing from the unique prism of class struggle began in the early 
 
1 We translated all the French quotes directly into English in the text. 





1990s. In his book À la conquête du chaos (Conquering Chaos, 1991), he laments the “bankruptcy of the 
predictive schemes of the left” (1991, 24), and explains that the scientific model to which the left refers has 
shown its limits. According to him, this theoretical reconsideration also questions “the identity of and the 
reason for being part of the socialist movement” (1991, 35). From then on, Mélenchon detached himself 
from economic and materialist essentialism, and started to add a cultural dimension to his analyses by relying 
on the writings of Antonio Gramsci, and by beginning to defend probabilistic materialism against linear ma-
terialism. In his own words, that period represented a “renewal of [his] fundamental philosophical base” that 
“also modified [his] tactical visions” (Benbara and Cargoët, 2018). 
Third, the victories of left-wing populist movements in Latin America in the 1990s and in the 2000s — 
known as the “pink tide” — explain the concretization of the interest in populism as a new discourse and a 
new theoretical reference. The “pink tide” gave visibility to the work of Ernesto Laclau, who considered that 
populism can take a progressive form that revitalizes democracy. The “pink tide” also validated the effec-
tiveness of the populist discourse as a strategy for gaining power. These events nourished the intellectual 
transition of Mélenchon, who considered that there is a “history of the movement of ideas embodied by polit-
ical movements” (Mouffe and Mélenchon, 2016). Mélenchon looked closely at those Latin American gov-
ernments and was particularly interested in three cases: Lula’s Workers’ Party in Brazil, Chavism in Vene-
zuela, and Rafael Correa’s “citizen’s revolution.” He even developed personal ties with these political actors 
(Marlière, 2019). Mélenchon explained that the Latin American experiences “produce[d] a change of per-
spective”: he stated that “it [was] no longer a question of building a revolutionary vanguard but of making of 
a revolting people a revolutionary people” (Benbara and Cargoët, 2018). At the beginning of the 2010s, he 
declared that he undertakes the term populist (Mélenchon, 2011), even though at the same time he consid-
ered that claiming this term, which is negatively connoted in ordinary language, was a difficult task” (Mé-
lenchon, 2012). During the 2017 presidential campaign, he appeared publicly many times alongside Chantal 
Mouffe, who sees left populism as the only progressive strategy capable of countering the populist right and 
fighting against neoliberalism.  
As we see in the next section, Mélenchon’s gradual intellectual evolution and interest in populism did not 
have an immediate impact on his political trajectory, as he remained an active member of the left-wing fac-
tion of the PS until 2008. However, it certainly paved the way for the adoption of a populist strategy when a 
window of opportunity opened up. 
 
2.2 The Front de gauche: “gathering the left” to build a political majority 
 
Building on his search for new intellectual references to rebuild the left ideological framework, Mélen-
chon first organized within the PS in the early 1990s, with no intention to leave. This period enabled him to 
build a solid theoretical corpus and a loyal activist network around him. Yet, after the strong defeat of the PS 
in the 2002 presidential election, Mélenchon and those close to him (often named “Mélenchonists”) eventu-
ally began to contemplate the possibility for them to act outside the party, and especially the opportunity to 
work more closely with radical left parties, which appeared as allies who shared the need to reinvent them-
selves (Mathieu, 2015). They imagined that building ties with the radical left within a large coalition would 
anchor the PS on the left and stop the drift toward social liberalism. As such, since 2003, Mélenchonist activ-
ists have engaged with radical left activists and have supported several public pleas to “rebuild the true left.” 
However, at first, they did not push the logic to the end. They continued to prioritize their loyalty to the PS 
and to believe they would be able to enact a change of political orientation from within the party.  




From the mid-2000s, the emancipation from the PS started with Mélenchonists experimenting with new 
coalitions, but still on a left-wing basis. In 2005, they opposed the European Constitutional Treaty and decid-
ed to campaign against it alongside radical left parties, while the PS officially supported it. To gain more au-
tonomy, they created a club called Pour la république sociale (For the Social Republic), which would serve 
as a tool for emancipating themselves from the PS without formally leaving it. That period laid the first mile-
stones of the Mélenchonists’ shift toward dissidence with the PS (Crespy, 2008). Indeed, the growing ties be-
tween Mélenchonist activists and radical left activists led them to rethink the costs and benefits of the intra-
partisan game compared to the investment in extra-partisan actions. Mélenchon participated in the design of 
an “anti-liberal charter” (activists’ writing, 2006) that was supposed to serve as a unitary platform for the 
presidential campaign of 2007. For a short time he was even considered as the potential unitary candidate of 
the radical left, but his socialist membership worried some of the activists. In the end, the PS lost the 2007 
presidential elections after supporting a moderate candidate — Ségolène Royal — and the radical left failed 
to agree on a common candidate.  
In the aftermath of the 2007 presidential election, Mélenchon and his faction decided it was time to offi-
cially split with the Parti socialiste and to prepare an exit plan by working with the radical left. Mélenchon 
and those close to him theorized the need for a new unitary left-wing party that would encompass them as 
former members of the PS along all existing radical left parties, with the goal of regaining cultural hegemo-
ny, becoming a majoritarian party, and leading a governmental coalition (activists’ writing, 2007). Citing the 
German model of Die Linke as a reference and as proof of the success of the cooperation between former so-
cialists and the radical left, Mélenchonists based their hopes on privileged collaboration with the PCF. The 
communists responded positively, but amended the project: they did not wish to disappear as a party, and in-
stead proposed to form a strong electoral coalition (activists’ writing, 2008). Eventually, Mélenchon and his 
faction officially announced their resignation from the Parti socialiste on 7 November 2008 (Mélenchon and 
Dolez, 2008). A few days later, they also put an end to their club and instead founded a new party called Par-
ti de Gauche (Left Party, PG). On 18 November, the Front de gauche coalition was launched to prepare for 
the 2009 European elections. 
The dynamic of the Front de gauche generated a lot of enthusiasm. Activists of the French radical left, 
whose occasional cooperation had so far struggled to achieve lasting objectives, was quickly restructured 
around this new coalition (Alexandre, 2014). The cartel expanded to new collaborators2, until it included al-
most all French radical left parties. At the ballot box, the Front de gauche gradually saturated the radical left 
electorate as well (Confesson, 2013). The 2009 European elections were a first satisfactory test, convincing 
the communists to renew the electoral cartel for the following local intermediate elections. The Front de 
gauche reached its electoral peak during the 2012 presidential campaign after communists agreed to support 
Mélenchon’s candidacy instead of their own candidate. They agreed on a common platform, and even though 
Mélenchon was the candidate on the ballot, the communists strongly weighed in the campaign as they 
worked within a coalition of parties; most of the campaigning in the field was supported by the numerous 
communist activists, while Mélenchonists had no big organization to rely on. This collective candidacy 
scored 11% of the vote share during the first round of the presidential election.  
However, the strategy of the Front de gauche entered a phase of turbulence after 2012, as the interests of 
the two main components — the PG for the Mélenchonists and the PCF for the communists — diverged too 
 
2 Notably smaller radical left parties such as the Fédération pour une alternative sociale et écologique (Federation for a Social 
and Ecological Alternative, FASE), or activists who split from the Trotskyist party labeled Nouveau partianticapitaliste (New 
Anti-Capitalist Party, NPA) considering that they were at a dead end if they remained on their own. 





much. Among the subjects of disagreement was the stance toward the Parti socialiste who won the presiden-
tial and legislative elections in 2012. Their win brought François Hollande to power, and members of the 
Front de Gauche were called to position on whether or not they would support a socialist government. Mé-
lenchonists were strictly against it, while communists were tempted. In addition, the question of the nature of 
the Front de gauche became central. Conceived as an electoral coalition, it was after all no more than a sym-
bolic empty shell in terms of organization. There was no independent leadership, and all decisions had to be 
approved by consensus among party members (activists’ writing, 2013). Elected MPs from the FG were not 
in the same political group in the National Assembly, and the question of the mutualization of budgets, ex-
penses, and reimbursements remained an unresolved conflict. As such, some party members claimed that the 
Front de Gauche should be more formally organized. They argued that it should be able to welcome activists 
without party membership to participate directly, and that spokespersons should be designated to deal with 
the media and with other parties in the name of Front de Gauche, outside of the control of the communists or 
the Mélenchonists.  
The latter were quite in favor of institutionalizing the Front de Gauche, as it was their aim from the begin-
ning to form a large radical left party. Nevertheless, communists still vetoed this possibility, and the relation-
ship continued to deteriorate. Against this backdrop, the FG approached the local and European elections of 
2014 without enthusiasm and the regional elections of 2015 were chaotic, as the coalitions varied across lo-
calities. In consequence, strengthened by his presidential fame, Mélenchon and his close associates began to 
consider a new strategy to free themselves from the constraints of the electoral cartel. 
 
2.3. La France insoumise: “federate the people” to build a social majority 
 
Unlike other European countries in which left-wing populism arose in reaction to austerity plans following 
the economic crisis of 2008 and the debt crisis in 2010, the French case is different. Its implementation by 
Mélenchon stemmed from a strategic reorientation, following the limits of the strategy of the Front de 
gauche and under the influence of new inspirational models that had emerged in the meantime, especially the 
Spanish political party Podemos which was built on a populist hypothesis largely inspired by the theory of 
Ernesto Laclau and Latin American inclusive populism (Chazel, 2019; Nez, 2015). Indeed, Mélenchon later 
declared that LFI, the new movement he founded in 2016, was “the son, the daughter of Podemos” (Mélen-
chon, 2018). 
As demonstrated in the first section of this paper, Mélenchon was confronted with post-Marxism and left-
wing populist theories quite early on, before he formed a radical left electoral coalition together with the 
communists, and even before he left the Parti socialiste. His decision to gradually adopt a transversal dis-
course instead of a left-oriented discourse was also justified by the fact that, according to him, the “left” sig-
nifier had been emptied of its substance because of the neoliberal turn of the social democrats in power under 
Hollande’s presidency. In addition, he set on a mission to reach out to part of the RN voters, who vote for the 
populist radical right to express their anger with the political system but do not truly share radical right val-
ues. In addition, realizing that the Front de Gauche was in a deadlock as long as the communists do not 
abandon their party and their left-wing strategy, he progressively became interested in implementing the 
populist strategy on his own in terms of organization. He aimed to emancipate himself from political parties’ 
games and try to reach a broader electorate than the one already covered by the radical left. To justify the 
change in terms of party organization, Mélenchon lamented “the necrosis of the Front de gauche, trans-
formed into a small cartel of parties” (Mouffe and Mélenchon, 2016). He explained that the organization of 




the Front de gauche corresponded to “a tool for class action,” whereas LFI, a party-movement, represented 
“the organized form of the people” (Mélenchon, 2017).  
In August 2014, Mélenchon slowly initiated the transition. He left his position as co-president of the Parti 
de gauche and founded in parallel the Mouvement pour la sixième république (Movement for the Sixth Re-
public, M6R) in September that same year. The main demands of the M6R largely echoed the Front de 
gauche’s political platform, but the movement — which was defined as “neither a political party nor an asso-
ciation” — claimed to be a “citizen's network” (activists’ writing, 2014) without any political affiliation. The 
M6R consisted of a national board to lead and an ethics committee, but above all it presented itself as a hori-
zontally organized network that relied on an online participatory platform called Nous le peuple (We the 
People). The M6R was meant to be a “non-electoral test” of the effectiveness of the populist strategy (Con-
fesson 2019, 312). Yet, the failure of this movement did not slow Mélenchon down in his evolution toward a 
populist strategy for the 2017 presidential elections, a ballot that is particularly fitted for charismatic leaders’ 
rhetoric, a recurring corollary of populism. 
This strategic evolution culminated in February 2016, when Mélenchon officially declared himself candi-
date for the 2017 presidential election, “outside any party framework.” His objective was no longer to “bring 
the left together,” but to “federate the people” through a new party-movement called La France insoumise 
(LFI), founded at the same time. LFI was presented as a “gaseous” movement organized in transversal net-
works. Under the claimed influence of Bernie Sanders’s democratic primary campaign and based on the 
M6R model, LFI was organized through an online platform that allowed Internet users to become members 
without paying fees, and to participate, online, in the expansion of the political platform. Inspired by the 
“Circles” organization of Podemos, LFI built its territorial organization on “support groups” created sponta-
neously by the movement’s members. The Parti de gauche eventually dissolved into La France insoumise in 
2017. The main leaders of the PG then became the main media figures of LFI. 
Mélenchon was thus emancipated from a left-wing coalition and no longer needed to concede strategic 
orientations to partners. Even though the PCF and other small radical left parties finally rallied him in his run 
for the 2017 presidential election, Mélenchon and his team had more room for maneuver to implement a 
populist strategy and deliver discourses more infused with populism than in 2012 (see Section 2.1). This 
strategy appeared successful, while in the meantime the Parti socialiste collapsed, pressured to the right by 
Emmanuel Macron’s campaign. Mélenchon obtained 19.5% of the votes and narrowly missed qualifying for 
the second round. However, despite his desire to transcend partisan conflicts by presenting himself as the 
candidate of the “people,” Mélenchon still remained a candidate associated with the left in the collective im-
agery, as the profile of his electorate illustrates (see Section 2.2). Facing this partial failure, collective enthu-
siasm faded and the end of the campaign led to the end of collaboration, for the second time. During the fol-
lowing legislative elections held on 11 and 18 June 2017, the PCF as well as other allies of LFI presented in-
dependent candidatures. Relations between LFI and the PCF began to deteriorate again, and the communist 
MPs preferred to form their own parliamentary group.  
Since the first comparative studies of Mudde and March (2005) on the transformation of the radical left 
family and the advent of the socialist populist sub-family, it took about a decade for a French case to emerge. 
Scrutinizing the genesis of LFI, it is necessary to stress that it is the result of both (1) a long-term mutation of 
ideological and intellectual resources that circulate among the radical left family between countries and in-
spire leaders to experiment with new strategies, and (2) contextual considerations, such as material resources 
and relationships between parties that enable a window of opportunity to substantiate such a populist strate-
gy.  





In the next section, we illustrate how the populist turn of Jean-Luc Mélenchon stands out in his discourses 
between 2012 and 2017. In counterpoint, we show that the populist strategy did not produce the expected re-
sults in terms of electorate. 
 
 
3. Discursive and Electoral Comparison of the Front de gauche and La France 
insoumise Strategies in the 2012 and 2017 Presidential Elections 
 




In the minimal, formal, and discursive definition of populism we have adopted, populism is defined based 
on three elements: the appeal to the people, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty (Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 
2004). The appeal to the people and anti-elitist elements imply a (relative) detachment from the left-right ax-
is — and thus from the mythology and phraseology of the traditional radical left — in favor of drawing an 
antagonistic border between the people and the elite. Regarding the third element, the emphasis on popular 
sovereignty goes hand in hand with the defense of a radicalization of democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), 
a kind of “democratic extremism” (Charalambous and Ioannou, 2019). As explained in the introduction, we 
also added other elements to this definition. In order to identify the degree of populism in a discourse, we ex-
amined five elements: (1) the relationship between the left-right and the people-elite axes (which implies de-
tachment from the leftist symbology); (2) popular sovereignty (radicalization of democracy); (3) a national-
popular discourse; (4) the “proclamation of a crisis”; and (5) strong leadership.  
Based on these criteria, both the 2012 and 2017 campaigns led by Mélenchon can be described as populist. 
However, in 2017 one can observe a greater degree of populism in his discourse, as Mélenchon added two 
populist elements to it: the mobilization of an opposition between the people and the elite which implies a 
partial rejection of the identity of the left, and greater personalization around his figure. 
We conducted a corpus-based analysis by exploiting a highly diverse set of data of different nature (oral 
and written) in order to generate a “system of assumptions where the multiple variables of communication 
are controlled” (Bonnafous and Tournier, 1995). As corpora are always non-exhaustive (Charaudeau, 2009), 
completeness of a corpus is not sought, and the corpus is therefore considered “partial” and “open.” The 
choice was made to combine quantitative (lexicometric) and qualitative methods, considering that scholars 
highlighted the advantage of combining the two methods, which complement each other and produce similar 
results, when studying populism (Font et al., 2021; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). 
The lexicometric analysis was carried out by using a corpus of meetings, blog posts, press interviews, and 
the political program in the 2012 and 2017 campaigns3, and treated through Iramuteq, a textual analysis 
software enabling to perform frequency analyses. The frequency analysis involves comparing different cor-
pora to one another. Since the size of the corpora is not homogeneous, we reduced the frequency to 100,000 
words in order to compare the two campaigns. The lexicometric analysis was complemented by a qualitative 
 
3 Twelve meetings were randomly selected for the 2012 campaign, and nine for the 2017 campaign. The higher number of 
meetings in 2012 is explained by their shorter duration compared to the meetings in 2017, and the aim to have two corpora of 
relatively equivalent size. 




analysis of the discourse and ethnographic fieldwork, which allowed, for example, to recontextualize the 
leader’s statements and study aesthetic changes.  
 
Table 1– Corpus used to analyze Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s campaigns during the French 2012 and 2017 presidential elections 
 
  Meeting speeches Blog post Press interview Program 
2012 
Number of texts 12 33 6 1 
Time span 
29 June 2011 to 6 
May 2012 
1 February 
2011 to 12 
April 2012 




Number of texts 9 28 10 1 
Time span 
5 June 2016 to 6 
May 2012 
8 July 2016 to 
7 May 2017 
26 August 2016 to 
16 April 2017 
2017 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
Table 2 - Absolute (relative/100 000) frequencies of use of lemmas related to the right/left axis and the people-power axis in France 
 
 2012 2017 
Signifiers of the left 
Capitalisme  [Capi-
talism] 
147 (82) 15 (7,6) 
Socialisme [Social-
ism] 
122 (68) 49 (24,9) 
Classe [Class] 42 (23,4) 36 (18,3) 
Ouvrier [Worker] 81 (45,2) 72 (36,5) 
Gauche [Left] 260 (145) 110 (55,9) 
Droite [Right] 149 (83,1) 97 (49,2) 
Révolution [Revolu-
tion] 
50 (27,9) 46 (23,3) 
Camarade [Com-
rade] 
84 (46,8) 23 (11,7) 
Signifiers of the people-elites axis 
Caste [Caste] 4 (2,2) 16 (8,1) 
Oligarchie [Oligar-
chy] 
10 (5,6) 16 (8,1) 
Elites [Elite] 11(6,1) 0 (0) 
Peuple [People] 265 (147,8) 227 (115,2) 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
The ethnographic fieldwork was based on participant observation conducted in three meetings during the 
2017 electoral campaign: the “March for the 6th Republic” held in Paris on 18 March 2017, the “Meeting for 





Peace” held in Marseille on 9 April 2017, and the “Meeting for Freedom” held in Toulouse on 16 April 
2017. The qualitative analysis allowed us to correct the biases associated with the purely quantitative analy-
sis. 
Mélenchon’s discourses in 2012 and in 2017 show several similarities. In both campaigns, Mélenchon de-
veloped a strong populist discourse, relying on three elements: popular sovereignty, patriotism, and the no-
tion that society is going through a crisis. The popular sovereignty element has been identified by scholars as 
the backbone of populism and is often associated with the necessity for a radicalization of democracy. There 
is thus an affinity between populism and direct democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In Mélen-
chon’s discourse, the idea of a democratic revolution finds its origins in his Latin American inspirations, 
which encouraged him to theorize the need for a citizen’s revolution linked to a constituent process. This is 
reflected in his 2012 and 2017 campaigns in a relatively similar way; for example, in his speech in which he 
insists on the “stolen sovereignty” by denouncing the “presidential monarchy,” and in him proposing the 
adoption of a Constituent Assembly and intending to lead a citizen revolution. In his written program, on the 
other hand, the convocation of a Constituent Assembly holds a central place in both campaigns. 
Many scholars have emphasized the links — contingent (Charalambous and Ioannou, 2019) or mechanical 
— between populism and nationalism. Nationalist rhetoric is said to structure the discourse of left-wing pop-
ulist movements — in Latin America and in Europe. In Mélenchon’s discourse, the “republican homeland” 
holds an important place. Mélenchon competes with Marine Le Pen’s radical right Rassemblement national 
to re-signify the term “nation.” He rejects the ethnocultural conceptions of the nation used by the right, and 
proposes a socioeconomic and democratic conception of the nation that emphasizes the importance of public 
services and social rights, with the intention of protecting the poorest citizens from the enemies of the home-
land which are the financial oligarchy, neoliberalism, and “ceux qui se gavent” (“those who fatten them-
selves”). Mélenchon associates the French nation with a political regime, the republic (more precisely, the 
social republic), which is based on the motto of “liberty, equality, fraternity.” As shown by Chiocchetti 
(2019), the adoption of a nationalist discourse by Mélenchon, both in 2012 and in 2017, represented a break 
from the traditional French radical left. Indeed, even if the French radical left has not always rejected the 
mobilization of a patriotic imagery, it had recently used the symbols of “the people, the nation, and the Re-
public” with “less vehemence and intensity.” In 2012, as in 2017, Mélenchon presented the Front de gauche 
and then La France insoumise as the culmination of the republican history. He constantly referred to the 
“great and glorious” revolutions of 1789 and 1870. In his patriotic narrative, one can find the idea of the 
“greatness” of France, which, as a “universalist nation,” must present itself as an example for the rest of the 
world, as well as the idea of the importance of recovering the sovereignty stolen from the people by the Eu-
ropean Union. The national imagery is thus widely present in the speeches of his two campaigns: 
 
France is not a Western nation, it is not [a Western nation] because of the diversity of its people, and 
because [France] is present in all the oceans of the world […] No, France is not a Western nation, it is a 
universalist nation! We are, and we want to be, because of what history has bequeathed to us, the first 
model of universalist nation.” Paris, 5 April 2012. 
 
Many scholars have also emphasized that the emergence and/or consolidation of populist movements, on 
both the right and the left, was largely propelled by contexts of crisis, or even that the crisis was a necessary 
condition for the appearance of populism. While in France the financial crisis of 2008 had a significant psy-
chological impact on the population, its economic impact was relatively low (Betz, 2016). Unlike his Euro-




pean counterparts who identified the 2008 crisis as an important turning point, Mélenchon insists above all 
on the “multiplication of crises” (Mélenchon, 2014) — social, ecological, capitalism, sovereignty, and de-
mocracy crises which materialize in a “crisis of civilization” (Charalambous and Ioannou, 2019). On 5 Feb-
ruary 2017, during a meeting held in Lyon, he explained that: 
 
Human civilization is not only threatened, it has the means to surpass the crisis it has entered because 
of climate disruption and other aspects that concern the human ecosystem only derailed by greed, by the 
will to appropriate everything, everywhere, without ceasing. Lyon, 5 February 2017. 
 
The adoption of a populist discourse contrasting the people with the elite does not always imply a total re-
jection of the left-right axis, as demonstrated, for instance, by the Latin American populism of the 1990s and 
2000s, which claimed to be socialist (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Nevertheless, the adoption of a 
populist discourse implies a certain degree of detachment from this axis in favor of the adoption of a more 
transversal rhetoric. When looking at this criterion, the 2012 and 2017 campaigns reveal notable differences. 
Indeed, contrary to 2012, in 2017 Mélenchon abandoned many left-wing signifiers. In 2017, Mélenchon con-
tinued to mobilize leftist symbols and rhetoric but far less vigorously than in 2012. The frequency analysis of 
the rhetoric used by Mélenchon in his discourses in 2012 and in 2017 indicates that he continued to address 
the social classes and workers, but mainly shows that some very strong signifiers of the left (capitalism, so-
cialism, comrade) were used much less in 2017 than in 2012. In order to conduct the analysis, we selected 
the terms that were related to socialist identity and populist identity (Chiocchetti, 2019). The most striking 
example is certainly the term “left” itself, which was used 145 times in every 100,000 words in 2012, and 
only 55.9 times in every 100,000 words in 2017. Regarding the signifiers linked to the people-elite axis, the 
analysis shows that the term “people” was used in a similar way in 2012 and in 2017. However, strong dif-
ferences can be seen between 2012 and 2017 regarding the “elite.” In 2017 the signifiers “caste” and “oligar-
chy” were used much more frequently than in 2012. 
 
Table 3 - Lexicometric characteristics of the corpora used for the lexicometric analyses 
 








Number of terms 2012 11020 
 
2017 8326 
   
Number of hapaxes 2012 4967 
2017 3439 
   
Average occurrences per text 2012 3383.60 
2017 3583.78 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 





This abandonment of left-wing signifiers is observed not only in verbal communication, but also in other 
important aspects. Mélenchon has not relinquished all the elements of the left; for instance, he continued to 
routinely wear the red triangle on his jacket, a working-class symbol and an opposition to the far-right. How-
ever, important aesthetic changes could be observed, for example, on campaign posters. In 2012, Mélenchon 
was presented alone, on a red background, with the slogan “Take the power,” while in 2017, a blue back-
ground was used with the slogan “The strength of the people.” We can also note that in 2012, at the end of 
each meeting, the communist and revolutionary song The Internationale was sung, followed by the French 
national anthem La Marseillaise, while in 2017 only the national anthem was sung. During the “Parade for 
the 6th Republic” organized on 18 March 2017, from the Bastille to the Place de la République, French flags 
were distributed to participants by the party. A scene observed during the “Meeting for Freedom” held on 16 
April 2017 in Toulouse illustrates this change in strategy. Security personnel asked the public to put away 
their red flags and union flags before entering the prairie des filtres where the meeting was held. At the end 
of the meeting, a few activists attempted to sing The Internationale, but were not joined by the rest of the au-
dience. 
Apart from its discourse, according to other scholars, populism is also characterized by an organization 
and a particular style of communication centered around the figure of the movement’s leader (Engesser et al., 
2017). The individualization of politics — the staging of the political representative — is far more developed 
among populist actors compared to traditional political formations (de Vreese et al., 2018). Regarding Mé-
lenchon, the communication strategy adopted by La France insoumise in 2017 was far more personalized 
than that of the Front de gauche in 2012, following the evolution from the strategy of a union of radical left 
parties to a populist strategy. This personalization can be seen in the formats and tools of communication 
used by the leader.  
Indeed, the personalization of Mélenchon’s communication can be observed in the choice of the commu-
nication tools used, and in particular by the increasing use of social networks in 2017 and in particular his 
YouTube channel. While this change was undeniably due to technological considerations, with social net-
works being much more developed in 2017 than in 2012, it should still be noted that Mélenchon was the only 
leading political representative to massively use YouTube in his communication, with the broadcasting of a 
weekly program called La Revue de la semaine (Review of the week). Social networks allow political lead-
ers to control their communication by addressing favorable topics (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013) without any 
contradiction. Social networks, especially audiovisual networks, also allow for greater personalization of po-
litical communication (Metz et al., 2019). It is indeed without any intermediary that Mélenchon can speak to 
his potential future voters by adopting a much more direct style, and not hesitate, with the prospect of build-
ing a close relationship with them, to reveal the backstage of the campaign or some personal anecdotes.  
Our analysis shows that the campaign led by Mélenchon in 2017 has therefore resulted in the addition of 
further degree of populism compared to the 2012 campaign, especially regarding the people-elite axis, and 
the hyper-leadership. This confirms the existing literature which has shown that “[Mélenchon] started tap-
ping in the rhetoric and imaginary of various populist movements across the world several years before the 
2017 presidential election” (Marlière, 2020), but that “the 2017 campaign marked a further populist shift 
from the point of view of rhetoric” (Chiocchetti, 2019). However, it should also be noted that considering 
that the “left/right divide was completely eclipsed” can be reductive (Chiocchetti, 2019), as Mélenchon never 
completely relinquished the symbols of the left. Rather, our analysis shows that in 2012 the populist strategy 
coexisted with a classical left strategy, while in 2017 both strategies coexisted but the populist strategy large-
ly dominated the rhetoric of LFI, leaving little room for the symbols and rhetoric of the left. 




3.2. The left or the people: changes and continuity in the structure of Jean-Luc Mé-
lenchon’s electorate 
 
The strategy and communication plan followed by Mélenchon and his campaign team during the 2012 and 
2017 presidential elections differed. While the candidate of the Front de gauche, despite some populist incli-
nations, primarily aimed to bring together the anti-liberal and radical left and challenge the hegemony of the 
Parti socialiste’s hegemony on the left of the political spectrum, the candidate of La France insoumise fol-
lowed a populist logic of more intense transversality and aimed to build a popular majority by agglomerating 
several segments of the electorate. Apart from remobilizing his core supporters from 2012, Mélenchon aimed 
to extend his electorate on the left by attracting disappointed socialists. But above all, he sought to position 
himself as the candidate of hope for non-voters and protesters, as well as for the “angered but not fascist” 
voters who tend to turn to the candidate of the Rassemblement national. From 2012 to 2017, Mélenchon 
gained almost ten points, rising from 11.1% to 19.5% of the popular votes, creating a victorious dynamic 
even though he did not qualify for the second round. Nonetheless, the comparative study of the social and 
political dynamics of electoral choices in 2012 and 2017 shows that the populist strategy of 2017 did not 
reach its initial objectives. Paradoxically, in 2017, the growing support for Mélenchon was based more on a 
broader gathering of the left than on a federation of the people. To illustrate this, we used data from the two 
post-election surveys: the French Electoral Study of 2012 and of 20174.  
 
From the perspective of social dynamics, the 2012 candidate attracted mixed profiles (Vasilopoulos et al., 
2015), suggesting that he had managed to emancipate himself from the communist sociology and electoral 
geography to extend also to voters with profiles closer to the new radical left reshaped by post-materialism 
(Table 4). Thus, the age groups demonstrate good performance among the younger generations on the one 
hand, but also a respectable score among individuals of working age on the other. Similarly, the electoral 
penetration of professionals and socio-professional categories shows that the Mélenchon vote was not a class 
vote or even a popular vote (Tiberj, 2013), since while the workers are slightly over-represented, there is also 
an over-representation of intermediate professions and even of executives. Income does not appear to be a 
determining criterion, confirming that the candidate did not particularly attract the vote of the precarious 
(Cautrès, 2013).  
In 2017, the LFI vote became even more generational, with a gap of more than 20 percentage points be-
tween the 18–34 and 65+ age groups. The level of education was a determining factor among young people. 
In terms of social class, the strong increase in Mélenchon’s scores among the working class, particularly 
among employees, should not detract from the very sharp increase in the votes of craftsmen, shopkeepers, 
and company directors. Overall, the vote for Mélenchon was even less determined by profession than in 
2012, and was more characterized by low income. Paradoxically, this dynamic among the most precarious 
was concomitant with a strong breakthrough among the highly educated. It is therefore not just any faction of 
the working class that voted for Mélenchon in 2017, but those whose social status does not correspond to 
their level of education, while he failed to compete with the Rassemblement national among the less educat-
ed (Cautrès, 2017). 
 
 
4 Surveys are part of the global research program Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The French Electoral 
Study 2012 was a face-to-face (CAPI) fieldwork conducted in May 2012, with a quota sample of 1,830 individuals. The 
French Electoral Study 2017 was also a CAPI survey conducted in May 2017, with a stratified random sample of 2,014 indi-
viduals. 





Table 4 - Evolution of Jean Luc Mélenchon's electoral share from 2012 to 2017 in different segments of the electorate (in % rounded up to the 
unit)5 
 
 Presidential election 2012 (1st 
round) 




All 11 20 +9 
Age group    
18-24 years old 16 32 +16 
25-34 years old 13 33 +20 
35-44 years old 13 24 +11 
45-54 years old 13 20 +7 
55-64 years old 9 17 +8 
65+ years old 6 10 +4 
Social class    
Farmers 0 5 +5 
Craftmen& entrepreneurs 3 20 +15 
Executives and intellectual pro-
fessions 
12 19 +4 
Middle classes 13 26 +10 
Employees 9 29 +19 
Manual workers 14 25 +9 
Retired 7 13 +6 
Unemployed 9 29 +20 
Income level    
Low 12 23 +11 
Middle 12 20 +8 
Wealthy 10 17 +7 
Education level    
Elementary 7 15 +8 
Lower manual degree 11 19 +8 
Baccalaureate 17 22 +5 
Bachelor’s degree 10 22 +12 
Master’s degree 11 22 +11 
Crossings    
18-34 years old + manual de-
gree 
15 19 +4 
18-34 years old + master’s de-
gree 
11 51 +40 
High income + master’s degree 8 17 +9 
Low income + master’s degree 27 62 +35 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
5 Data weighted by basic socio-demographics (no education level) and actual results from the first and second round weight3 
in FES 212 and w6 in FES2017.  




In terms of political dynamics, in 2012 Mélenchon achieved his best score among former communist vot-
ers, validating the choice of the Parti communiste français to support the former socialist. He also obtained 
extremely high scores among both an electorate familiar with the far-left and among ecologists. Mélenchon 
managed to federate the voters of the anti-liberal left who are usually split between several candidates. How-
ever, his attempt to compete with the socialist candidate for the hegemony of the left failed. On the one hand, 
socialist voters had little interest in Mélenchon; on the other hand, the candidate attracted only 16% of those 
who declared themselves to be on the left and 33% of those who declared themselves to be “very left-wing,” 
as well as 22% of union members. In counterpoint, two trends indicated some hope for the future for the 
Front de gauche candidate — his emerging dynamics among non-voters and among first-time voters. 
While Mélenchon increased his score considerably between 2012 and 2017, it is nevertheless necessary to 
note that it was not so much thanks to his populist strategy, but rather to the fact that he succeeded in federat-
ing the left. It is true that he managed to improve his score among abstainers and first-time voters, but that is 
not where the real dynamics occurred. Mélenchon had a large majority among individuals who declared 
themselves “very far-left,” and a strong dynamic among individuals on the left. Sociologically and geograph-
ically, the “Mélenchon vote” was directly fed by the negative dynamics of the socialist candidacy led by Be-
noît Hamon. This reversal of the balance of power made him the “hidden winner” (Cautrès, 2017) of those 
presidential elections.  
However, the popular and defiant electorate Mélenchon wanted to capture from the Rassemblement na-
tional was not reached. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the popular electorate did not particularly give 
their vote to LFI. On the other hand, there was no trace of a shift of votes from right-wing and populist radi-
cal right-wing voters to LFI (Table 4). We can also see the low attractiveness of Mélenchon among the most 
depoliticized individuals who cannot be positioned on a left-right axis. Those individuals continued to vote 
for Marine Le Pen much more. In 2017 Mélenchon attracted more voters from the classic left than non-
voters and far-right voters. This “irony” (Marlière, 2020) can be explained in several ways. First of all, it is 
likely that, according to a “bandwagon” mechanism, well known in the explanation of electoral dynamics 
(Nadeau et al., 1993), Mélenchon became the useful vote on the left from the moment the polls placed him 
well ahead of the socialist party candidate Benoît Hamon. We can also assume that despite his efforts to dis-
tance himself from a solely left-wing positioning, Mélenchon remained widely identified with this camp 
within the electorate, especially as in 2017, just like in 2012, he developed a program in which purely mate-
rialistic issues were strongly present. 
Finally, a comparison between the electoral dynamics of 2012 and 2017 concerning Mélenchon in terms 
of political attitudes and major areas of values shows that, taken as a whole, not many differences were pre-
sent. The voters of both the Front de gauche and La France insoumise shared the main orientation of the rad-
ical left in Europe, demonstrating that whether or not a populist strategy is applied, Mélenchon remains with-
in the field of the left: a slightly more marked interest in politics, associated with a relative mistrust toward 
the functioning of democratic institutions and political representatives (Gomez et al., 2016), an ambivalent 
criticism of European integration which is not fully integrated into Euroscepticism, a rejection of xenophobia 










Table 5 - Evolution of Jean Mélenchon's electoral share from 2012 to 2017 in different segments of the electorate (in % rounded up to the unit)6 
 
 Presidential election 2012 (1st 
round) 




All 11 20 +9 
Past voting behaviour    
Abstainers 14 27 +13 
First time voter 21 32 +11 
Laguiller/Arthaud (extreme left) 31 62 +31 
Besancenot/Poutou (extreme left) 44 42 -2 
Buffet / Mélenchon (radical left) 79 77 -2 
Royal/ Hollande (socialist party) 11 24 +13 
Voynet / Joly (greens) 29 25 -4 
Bayrou (center) 7 12 +5 
Sarkozy (rightwing party) 2 4 +2 
Le Pen (populist radical right) 2 1 -1 
Political attitudes    
Very left-wing 33 63 +30 
Left-wing 16 34 +18 
Right-wing 3 3 = 
Very right-wing 1 2 +1 
Interested in politics 16 20 +4 
Not interested in politics 9 19 +10 
Not interested + neither left-wing nor 
righ-wing 
8 14 +6 
Union member 22 33 +11 
Dissatisfied with democracy 14 24 +10 
Defiant towards representatives 14 24 +10 
Values    
Xenophobia 6 12 +6 
Authoritarianism 10 17 +7 
Euroscepticism 12 19 +7 
Social justice 13 24 +11 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
6 Data weighted by basic socio-demographics (no education level) and actual results from the first and second round with the 
variable weight3 in FES 212 and w6 in FES2017. Values and opinions about the political system are measured from the fol-
lowing four variables replicated in both surveys: 'There are too many immigrants in France' (w1_1/O12); In society, there 
should be a hierarchy and leaders" (w1_2/O47); "The government should take measures to reduce the income gap" (r1/O24) 
“Do you think that France has benefited or not from its membership of the European Union? "(g2/EU2); "Are you satisfied 
with the way the democracy works in France” (I3/ PR14) ; “To what extent do you trust politicians in France” (I6) and “The 
majority of politicians are trustworthy” (O39). The variables are scales of agreement with four positions except for support for 
European integration and confidence in representatives (respectively 3 positions / 0-10 scale). We gathered positive and nega-
tive answers as to obtain a binary statistic of support or non-support but we reported only one side to avoid an overloaded ta-
ble.  






This article has discussed the evolution of the French radical left since the 2000s and the left populist turn 
across several dimensions: from an ideological point of view (with the shift from Marxism to post-Marxism), 
from an organizational and strategic point of view (with the creation of the Front de gauche, founded in 
2009, which was supposed to bring together the forces of the radical left, and which was replaced by La 
France insoumise in 2016), and from a discursive point of view. These three elements (ideological, organiza-
tional, and discursive) did not mutate at the same time. We have shown that the ideological bases of popu-
lism were present in Mélenchon’s trajectory since the early 1990s, but that it was not until a specific political 
context appeared that Mélenchon actually put this new strategy into practice, in a different context than Po-
demos which he used as a model (without a strong economic crisis but with strong competition with a popu-
list radical right party). We believe that the case of La France insoumise is a good example of a long-term 
change, and how the implementation of the populist strategy, notwithstanding its ideological grounding, is 
dependent on the political context. 
This article also shows that a vision which opposes the strategies of the Front de Gauche and of La France 
insoumise too strongly would be too simplistic. Several elements of the populist discourse were already pre-
sent in 2012 (patriotism, crisis, popular sovereignty). However, two new elements were mobilized by Mélen-
chon much more in 2017 (the people-elite axis, strong leadership), rendering his populist discourse more 
complete. It is therefore a rather gradual evolution that we are witnessing between 2012 and 2017, with the 
particular context of the 2017 campaign encouraging Mélenchon to develop additional populist elements 
with the creation of La France insoumise. In 2017, with this strategy, Mélenchon sought to go beyond the 
electorate of the radical left that he was able to win over in 2012, but he only partially succeeded in achiev-
ing this objective. Although his electoral result improved considerably between the two elections, his gains 
were mainly among left-wing voters, benefiting from the collapse of the Parti socialiste as much as contrib-
uting to it.  
If Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s strategy in 2017 consisted of an additional degree of populism compared to the 
one adopted in 2012, he appears to have taken a step backwards since the end of the presidential election For 
instance, the choice of Manon Aubry, an Oxfam activist and rising figure on the left, as head of La France 
insoumise’s list for the European elections in May 2019 seemed to suggest a return to a more classical left-
wing strategy. In the same way, in the June 2021 regional elections, LFI formed alliances with various other 
left-wing parties, which also suggested a setback for the populist strategy. However, regarding the advent of 
new presidential election in 2022, Mélenchon seems to have opted again for the populist strategy. Like in 
2017, he declared himself a candidate very early and outside of any party strategy. He recently chose the 
name Union populaire (Popular Union) to lead the movement, and reminds us that he will not go back to a 
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